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Why does Mutual Fund Performance not Persist? 
The Impact and Interaction of Fund Flows and Manager Changes 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper investigates the reasons for the lack of long-term persistence in the investment performance of actively 
managed equity mutual funds. We document that the responses of investors, fund managers, and investment 
management companies to past performance have an important impact on future performance. Conditioning on fund 
flows and manager changes allows us to predict future performance of both past outperforming (winner) and past 
underperforming (loser) funds. Recent winner funds, experiencing neither high inflows nor the departure of a skilled 
fund manager, outperform by 3.60 percentage points based on risk-adjusted returns in the following year, relative to 
winner funds suffering from both effects. We also find that the performance of the worst performing funds experiencing 
both the replacement of the fund manager (internal governance) and high outflows (external governance) enjoy a 
subsequent increase in performance of 2.40 percentage points in the following year, relative to loser funds not 
experiencing these effects. Among loser funds, in particular, both mechanisms appear to interact strongly. 
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1 Introduction 
It is now widely recognized that equity mutual fund performance does not persist in the long run, 
although there is evidence for short-run persistence among both winner and loser funds.2 Berk and Green 
(2004) argue that, if there are decreasing returns to scale in active management and investors react to 
past performance, the asset base managed by a portfolio manager adjusts to her individual skill level, 
driving away previous out- or underperformance. Their model implies that fund flows is one key 
mechanism that prevents persistent outperformance, but also removes persistent underperformance. 
Large money inflows into recent winners usually reduce future performance through transaction 
costs and distorted trading decisions, as reported by Edelen (1999) and Alexander, Cici and Gibson 
(2007). However, these studies also report that outflows are as harmful for future performance as 
inflows, a finding that is incompatible with Berk and Green (2004)’s claim that underperforming funds 
benefit from withdrawals. Chen et al. (2004) report that small funds outperform large funds, an outcome 
that is consistent with decreasing returns to scale in fund management. However, they do not relate their 
results to past fund flows. We extend this analysis and ask whether the response of fund flows to past 
performance is large enough to explain the mean reversion in performance of both winner and loser 
funds. 
It is not only outside investors who react to past performance. Both the portfolio manager and the 
investment management company (IMC) might also react: an alternative mechanism to explain mean 
reversion in fund performance is manager changes (Khorana, 1996, 2001). A successful fund manager 
can increase her compensation by switching to another fund, while the IMC can replace a poorly 
performing manager. Dangl, Wu and Zechner (2008) develop a model in which poorly performing 
managers are subject to both “external governance” from investors withdrawing funds and “internal 
                                                 
 
2 See, e.g., Carhart (1997), Bollen and Busse (2005), Huij and Verbeek (2007). 
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governance” associated with the termination of their contracts. It is important to analyze both 
mechanisms jointly. 
The objective of our research is to investigate how far fund flows and manager changes act as 
“equilibrating mechanisms” (as defined by Berk and Green, 2004, p. 1271) to explain mean reversion in 
mutual fund returns and, if so, how both mechanisms interact. We analyze these effects for a CRSP 
sample of 3,946 actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds over the period from 1992 to 2007. The 
performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of past performance is evaluated, concentrating on 
the winner (top-decile) and loser (bottom-decile) portfolios. These winner and loser portfolios are split 
into subgroups based on fund flows and manager changes, and we examine the contribution of these 
alternative equilibrating mechanisms on performance.  
We provide empirical evidence that fund flows and manager changes are important mechanisms 
for weakening performance persistence, both individually and in combination. The average four-factor 
alpha of winner funds that receive high inflows is reduced by an average of 2.52 percentage points in the 
following year compared with winner funds that do not experience extreme inflows. We also find that 
manager changes have a significant impact on the performance persistence of past winner funds. Losing 
a top-decile manager results in a 1.44 percentage points lower performance in the following year 
compared with winner funds that keep their star manager. Moreover, we find that both mechanisms help 
to predict future performance, allowing us to identify those winner funds that continue to significantly 
outperform a four-factor benchmark. Winner funds not experiencing these mechanisms – having 
relatively low net inflows and no change in manager – outperform those winner funds suffering both 
effects simultaneously, with a spread of 3.60 percentage points in the following year. This is 
approximately equal to the sum of the separate effects, indicating that the effects, in the case of winner 
funds, are additive and neither magnify nor offset each other. These results are not driven by differences 
in fee levels and hold on a gross management fee basis.  
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Our results for losing funds are different. We find that the more important equilibrating 
mechanism is internal (manager replacement) rather than external governance (outflows) which conflicts 
with the predictions of the Berk and Green (2004) model for loser funds. We find that, even though 
loser-fund raw returns benefit from withdrawals, alpha improves only by an insignificant 1.08 
percentage points relative to funds without outflows, implying outflows do not allow the existing 
managers to improve their performance from managing a smaller asset base. Manager changes, on the 
other hand, play an important role in the governance of loser funds both separately and in combination 
with fund flows. Firing an underperforming manager significantly improves loser-fund performance by 
an average of 0.96 percentage points in the following year relative to loser funds that keep the same 
manager. More significantly, internal and external governance mechanisms strongly reinforce each other 
and are more effective if applied simultaneously. The combined positive effect of 2.40 percentage points 
higher performance compared with funds not benefiting from either governance mechanism is larger 
than the sum of the individual effects. This finding indicates that outflows cannot improve performance 
on their own, but that outflows strongly contribute to performance reversals and, hence, to mean 
reversion if the manager is also replaced. Our results support the conjecture in Dangl, Wu and Zechner 
(2008) that it is important to control for manager changes when analyzing the role of external 
governance (fund flows).  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a review of the literature and 
our hypotheses. In section 3, we describe our data set and explain our research methodology. Our results 
are discussed in section 4: we first analyze funds flows, manager changes and their interaction separately 
for winner and loser funds before we perform a robustness check using a pooled regression approach. 
Section 5 concludes and draws implications. 
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2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
There is overwhelming empirical evidence that superior mutual fund performance does not persist in the 
long run, once survivorship bias is taken into account (Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1993; Elton, 
Gruber and Blake, 1996a, 1996b; Carhart, 1997; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2002). For outperformers, the 
traditional explanations for this phenomenon are the size of management fees and other costs, the 
absence of genuine management skill, and the momentum effect in individual stock returns spilling over 
into the subsequent evaluation period of fund performance (Carhart, 1997). By contrast, although some 
underperformers do improve their performance, the majority continue to underperform significantly their 
benchmarks, indicating that any persistence is clustered around loser funds (Brown and Goetzmann, 
1995; Carhart, 1997). Recent studies, however, point towards the persistence and predictability of short-
term fund performance (Bollen and Busse, 2005; Busse and Irvine, 2006; Huij and Verbeek, 2007). 
These studies challenge the traditional explanations for a lack of performance persistence. Fees are fairly 
stable and cannot explain why persistence exists in the short run, but vanishes over longer horizons. 
Berk and Green (2004) argue that mutual fund market equilibrium is attained through fund flows. 
Several studies show that investors respond to recent superior performance and ratings by investing 
additional funds and thus increasing the asset size of winner funds.3 Berk and Green’s argument relies on 
there being decreasing returns to scale in active fund management. Chen et al. (2004) and Yan (2008) 
provide evidence that transaction costs are positively correlated with fund size and the degree of 
illiquidity of the investment strategy. New investments of large funds are typically restricted to a limited 
range of liquid stocks and good investment opportunities eventually vanish as funds hit the capacity 
constraints on their investment strategies. Pollet and Wilson (2008) show that, rather than generate more 
“best ideas”, fund managers instead tend to scale up existing holdings as a response to inflows. Edelen 
(1999) and Alexander, Cici and Gibson (2007) argue that excessive fund flows encourage liquidity-
                                                 
 
3 See, e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998), Lynch and Musto (2003), DelGuercio and Tkac (2008) and Goriaev, Nijman and 
Werker (2008). 
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motivated, rather than valuation-motivated, investments and induce immediate transaction costs, both of 
which are detrimental to fund performance in the short run.4  
Consistent with the Berk and Green hypothesis of decreasing returns to scale, Chen et al. (2004) 
document that small funds significantly outperform large funds. However, differences in fund sizes are 
the result of both differences in the inflows accumulated throughout a fund’s full history since inception 
(external growth) and differential performance (internal growth) and so will only be of indirect relevance 
for testing the Berk and Green hypothesis. By contrast, our analysis directly investigates the role of 
investors’ responses to past performance and the importance of fund flows as an equilibrating 
mechanism. We extend the study of Chen et al. (2004), first, by considering differences in capacity 
constraints between winner funds and loser funds and, second, by allowing for capacity constraints 
relative to initial fund size, but at different levels of absolute fund size. This accounts for the possibility 
that capacity constraints differ across funds depending on their investment strategy. 
Fund growth is a relevant objective for fee-maximizing IMCs because management fees are 
usually a percentage of assets under management (AUM). Large net inflows do not benefit existing 
investors, however. To minimize the negative impact of inflows, while simultaneously increasing the 
compensation to successful managers, some funds might close to new investors in an attempt to preserve 
their superior performance and then increase fees. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that this does 
not tend to prevent a subsequent significant deterioration in alpha (Bris et al., 2007). Star fund managers 
can extract a larger share of the higher fee income by either moving to a larger fund within the same 
organization or to another IMC altogether if they are unable to negotiate an acceptable compensation 
                                                 
 
4 The “smart money effect” also analyzes the predictive content of fund flows (Gruber, 1996; Zheng, 1999). The 
reasoning is that sophisticated investors can predict manager skill and, in turn, their fund flows predict future 
performance. In this case, inflows are subsequently followed by outperformance, whereas outflows are followed by 
underperformance. The empirical evidence is inconclusive about the existence of a smart money effect, after controlling 
for the momentum effect (Sapp and Tiwari, 2004; Keswani and Stolin, 2008). Our study differs from this literature in 
that we first condition on past performance as a proxy for skills and then use the predictive power of conditioning on 
fund flows in a second step. 
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package related to the higher fee income received by the IMC.5 Moreover, a successful manager 
anticipating that she will not be able to repeat her outstanding performance in the future, mey decide to 
use her current favorable track record to find a higher paid job with a new IMC. In this case, the decision 
to stay or to leave will be the result of the manager’s own assessment of her investment skill. Empirical 
evidence indicates that promotions, with a successful fund manager subsequently managing a larger 
fund, are positively linked to past performance (Hu, Hall and Harvey, 2000; Baks, 2006). In any case, a 
winner fund that loses its star manager will need to hire a new manager, presumably with lower skills. 
Therefore, we would expect fund performance to deteriorate after the hiring of a new manager. Using a 
sample of 393 domestic equity and bond fund managers that were replaced over the period from 1979 to 
1991, Khorana (2001) finds that a manager change in outperforming funds results in a deterioration in 
post-replacement performance from 1.9 percent in the pre-replacement period to 0.4 percent in the third 
year. It appears manager changes can act as an additional curb on performance persistence to that arising 
from fund flows.  
Building on these arguments, our data set allows us to investigate the following hypotheses and 
questions about the joint effects of fund flows and manager changes on performance persistence in 
outperforming equity mutual funds:  
y Fund flows: Investors chase past performance and future performance suffers from high inflows, 
leading to stronger mean reversion for winner funds with higher net inflows. 
y Manager changes: A fund manager who leaves a winner fund is replaced with a less skilled 
manager, resulting in reduced performance and stronger mean reversion for winner funds with a 
change in manager. 
                                                 
 
5 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some mutual fund managers have increased their personal wealth by quitting their 
job as an employee in the mutual fund and setting up a hedge fund, such as Jeffrey N. Vinik, the former manager of 
Fidelity’s Magellan fund, in 1996. 
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y Which effect has the bigger impact on eliminating performance persistence? Are both effects in 
combination additive, magnifying or offsetting?  
In terms of Berk and Green (2004), for those winner funds that need to replace a departing fund 
manager, the fund size is now too large relative to the skill level of this new manager. These funds 
should subsequently underperform compared with winner funds without a manager change. Thus, an 
increase in fund size relative to managerial skill is the underlying factor causing both equilibrating 
mechanisms to lower performance.  
In addition to the long-term effect through an increased fund size, the fund-flow channel also 
captures the negative short-term effect of liquidity-induced transactions on performance, which is absent 
in the case of a fund-size adjustment through manager change. We would, therefore, expect the fund-
flow channel to act as a stronger curb on performance. On the other hand, the departure of a star fund 
manager might have a more negative impact on performance than the transactions costs associated with 
increased fund flows. So which effect has the larger impact will be an empirical issue.We would expect 
the combination of high inflows and manager changes to result in even more pronounced mean 
reversion. But it will also be an empirical issue whether the combined negative impact of inflows and 
manager changes on performance is simply the sum of the individual effects or whether the two effects 
are reinforcing or offsetting.  
In the case of underperforming (i.e., loser) funds, Dangl, Wu and Zechner (2008) consider 
alternative strategies for investors and the IMC. Once a fund has been identified as poorly performing, 
investors could choose to move their assets to a fund with greater potential: in other words, investors 
could exercise external governance and vote-by-feet. Yet, empirical evidence indicates that many 
investors in poorly performing funds fail to withdraw their investments (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Lynch 
and Musto, 2003). This could be because they anticipate a strategy change by the incumbent manager, or 
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the firing of a poorly performing manager, or because of a disposition effect.6 Transaction costs and the 
costs involved in gathering information about alternative funds will further reduce the mobility of 
capital. The consequence is that the fund-flow equilibrating mechanism is weak in underperforming 
funds and poor performance may persist, at least in the short term (Carhart, 1997; Berk and Tonks, 
2007). Large outflows, in particular, result in liquidity-motivated transactions which distort fund 
performance in the short term and impose an even stronger cost on loser funds than they do on winner 
funds. Coval and Stafford (2007) find that the performance of loser funds in distress and experiencing 
large outflows, hence making their trades predictable by others, deteriorates even more. These short-term 
liquidity-induced trading effects work in the opposite direction to the long-term effects on returns from 
decreasing returns to scale and this makes it more difficult for the performance of loser funds to return to 
the mean.7 Consequently, the fund-flow channel will be weaker among losers than winner funds. 
Several studies also document an inverse relationship between fund performance and manager 
changes (Khorana, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999b; Gallagher and Nadarajah, 2004). Moreover, 
demotions – the manager subsequently manages a smaller fund – are negatively linked to past 
performance (Hu, Hall and Harvey, 2000; Baks, 2006).8 For underperforming funds, Khorana (2001) 
documents that performance improves post replacement, with abnormal performance improving from 
-2.40 percent in the year before replacement to 0.50 percent in the third year after replacement. Hence, 
manager changes also appear to place a curb on (poor) performance persistence.  
                                                 
 
6 Investors are reluctant to realize losses and so stay invested until the fund price returns to the original purchase price 
(Shefrin and Statman, 1985). 
7 Note that in case of winner funds, the short-term effects of liquidity-induced trading and the long-term effects of 
decreasing returns to scale both operate in the same direction, magnifying the negative impact of inflows on winner-fund 
performance. 
8 However, rather than sacking an underperforming manager, IMCs might have an incentive to close or merge the losing 
fund and instead open a new fund, as small and young funds are known to exhibit a higher flow sensitivity than large 
and old funds (Sawicki and Finn, 2002). It has also been documented that funds which disappear due to merger or death 
tend to have poor performance just prior to disappearance (Brown and Goetzmann, 1995; Elton, Gruber and Blake, 
1996b; Lunde, Timmermann and Blake, 1999; Carpenter and Lynch, 1999; Carhart et al. 2002). 
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We will investigate the following hypotheses and questions about the effects of fund flows and 
manager changes on performance persistence in underperforming equity mutual funds:  
y Fund flows: Investors withdraw their money and performance improves as a result of a smaller 
asset base, since managers can concentrate on the most profitable investment opportunities and 
this leads to stronger mean reversion for loser funds with higher outflows, although this effect 
might be dampened by any investor inertia and by the costs of rearranging portfolios. 
y Manager changes: The IMC fires an underperforming fund manager and performance improves 
under a newly appointed fund manager, leading to stronger mean reversion for loser funds with a 
change in manager.  
y Which effect has the bigger impact on eliminating performance persistence? Are both effects in 
combination additive, magnifying or offsetting?  
Loser funds which replace their underperforming manager with a presumably better manager should 
subsequently outperform loser funds without a manager change. We would expect loser funds to benefit 
more from a manager replacement than from outflows. This is because the fund-flow channel involves 
transaction costs arising from the forced sales of assets. While the new manager will almost certainly 
change the asset composition of the fund, this can be done gradually without a market impact. On the 
other hand, significant fund outflows will lead to a quicker and more radical restructuring of the 
portfolio and consequently a faster return to normal performance. So again it is an empirical matter 
about which effect dominates. The question of how both mechanisms interact is also an empirical one. 
They are likely to be reinforcing when both mechanisms occur simultaneously, such as where an IMC 
fires a poorly performing fund manager in an attempt to stem outflows.9 But their effects would be 
neutralized in the case where investors fail to withdraw money from poorly performing funds in 
                                                 
 
9 In the case of corporations, Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003) provide empirical evidence that a reduction in institutional 
ownership increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. 
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anticipation of a manager change, but the IMCs delays firing the poorly performing fund manager 
because outflows did not materialize.  
3 Data and Research Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The data on mutual funds and the benchmarks are obtained from CRSP. Our sample starts in 1992, the 
first year for which reliable information on manager changes becomes available, and it ends in 2007. In 
constructing our sample, we follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) as closely as possible and select only 
actively managed domestic equity funds.10 We aggregate all share classes of the same fund and drop all 
observations prior to the IPO date given by CRSP and funds without names in order to account for a 
potential incubation bias (Evans, 2010). Our final sample consists of 3,946 funds that existed at some 
time during the period from 1992 to 2007 for at least 12 consecutive months. These funds have an 
average fund size of 899 million USD (Table 1). Fund size increased over the sample period, whereas 
average fees fell from 1.68 percent to 1.56 percent, as a result of economies of scale in direct expenses 
involved in asset management.11 
[ Please insert Table 1 about here ] 
Monthly fund flows are constructed from the change in total net assets adjusted for internal growth due 
to investment returns:  
(1) )1(1 itititit rTNATNAflow +−= −  
where TNAit refers to the total net assets of fund i at the end of period t and rit is the return of fund i 
between t-1 and t, assuming that all distributions are reinvested and net of fund expenses. Following the 
                                                 
 
10 Details about the data selection are given in the appendix. 
11 Fees are calculated as the sum of the annual expense ratio and 1/7 of the sum of the front end and back end loads. See 
also French (2008) for an analysis of changes in the fee structure over time. 
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argument of Berk and Tonks (2007), absolute flows are scaled by TNAit-1(1+rit) in order to obtain 
relative flows.12 On average, each fund received 2.70 million USD net inflows per month. 
To obtain information on manager changes, we focus on the variable mgr_date in the CRSP 
database, instead of using the specific names of the managers.13 This variable provides the date of the 
last manager change as reported by the IMC. By using the mgr_date variable, we avoid any problems 
associated with different spellings of manager names. Furthermore, as the number of team-managed 
funds increased during recent years, the manager date variable has the advantage that IMCs only report 
significant changes in manager that might have an impact on performance (Massa, Reuter and Zitzewitz, 
2010). A total of 6,492 manager changes occurred during our sample period. On average, 19 percent of 
the fund managers are replaced each year which is consistent with other studies.14 
3.2 Research Methodology 
We use both ranked portfolio tests (Carhart, 1997; Carpenter and Lynch, 1999; Tonks, 2005) and pooled 
regressions to investigate the hypotheses in Section 2.  
Ranked portfolio tests   Funds are first ranked into decile portfolios based on their previous-
year performance.15 Then, a second sorting of the top-decile-10 and the bottom-decile-1 funds is carried 
                                                 
 
12 If a fund merges with another one, we do not count the incoming assets as fund flows, because there is no additional 
cash to invest. Thus, the fund manager does not face the immediate problem of investing the inflows, but can adjust the 
portfolio weights gradually over time to minimize the performance impact. 
13 This variable has also been used by Lynch and Musto (2003) and Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2005). In theory, it shows 
the date that the manager leaves. However, for around 80 percent of observations, this is always the first of January. For 
the years 1992 and 1993, the variable is evenly distributed over different months. We conclude from this that the 
variable can only be used as an indicator of the year in which there was a manager change. One implication of this is that 
our data set is not sufficiently granular to investigate the impact of timing differences between fund flows and manager 
changes on subsequent fund performance. In other words, we are unable to test whether fund flows pre-date and hence 
possibly ‘cause’ a manager change or vice versa. We are only able to indicate that there were changes in fund flows as 
well as a manager change within the same year and then assess what effect these had on a fund’s subsequent 
performance.  
14 Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) report 18 percent and Ding and Wermers (2006) report 14 to 18 percent using a more 
detailed database on fund managers constructed from various sources. 
15 Repeating the same analysis for winner and loser funds with quintiles instead of deciles did not alter our results 
qualitatively. 
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out.16 Specifically, we form subgroups of the winner and loser deciles based on a single sorting on fund 
flows (high net inflows / low net inflows) or manager change (with manager change / without manager 
change), respectively (Figure 1). Furthermore, as we are interested in the interaction effects between 
both mechanisms, we form subgroups of the winner and loser decile based on a double sorting on fund 
flows and manager change simultaneously (high with / high without / low with / low without). The first 
sorting, based on past performance, separates good from bad managers, since we are interested in 
whether the same mechanisms that prevent persistent outperformance of skilled managers can also 
explain why badly performing managers regress towards the mean. We aim to separate the effects of a 
skilled manager leaving the fund or investors allocating large amounts of money to good managers from 
the effects of sacking an unskilled manager (i.e., internal governance) or investors withdrawing money 
from a bad manager (i.e., external governance). We then analyze the performance of these subgroups of 
top and bottom deciles, as well as the performance of spread portfolios to compare alternative 
investment strategies.  
In Berk and Green (2004), active management suffers from decreasing returns to scale, but it is 
an empirical question whether these capacity constraints are absolute or relative. Absolute capacity 
constraints arise once a certain threshold of absolute fund size is exceeded and depend on absolute fund 
flows. Relative capacity constraints differ across investment strategies and arise after the fund receives a 
certain level of inflows relative to the initial fund size. We analyze both absolute and relative net 
inflows, but in the presentation of our results we concentrate on absolute flows and only discuss relative 
flows when there are additional insights. 
[ Please insert Figure 1 about here ] 
                                                 
 
16 This methodology is similar to the one used for seasoned and unseasoned funds by Berk and Tonks (2007). However, 
their second sorting is based on the performance of the funds in the penultimate year. 
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Formation   The formation of decile portfolios is created by the first sorting and, to do this, we 
need to measure the alpha of each fund in the previous year. Specifically, funds are ranked based on 
alphas from a Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimated over the previous 12 months (the formation 
period). This model incorporates the Fama-French (1993) size (SMB) and value (HML) factors and the 
Carhart momentum factor (MOM) in addition to the market excess return (ermt) to explain fund excess 
returns and account for different fund styles: 
(2) ittititimtiiit MOMHMLSMBerer εββββα +++++= 4321  
In order to efficiently estimate a four-factor model over such a short horizon, we apply a Bayesian 
adjustment (Huij and Verbeek, 2007). This procedure involves the estimation of the Carhart model for 
each fund separately using OLS. Then the averages of the parameters of all other funds during the same 
period are used as priors. The final alpha and beta parameters for each individual fund are obtained as 
weighted averages of the OLS parameters and the prior, where the weights depend on the estimation 
efficiency of the OLS parameters.17 Thus, the Bayesian adjustment ‘shrinks’ any extreme parameters 
towards a grand mean, taking into account the cross-sectional distribution of the parameters.18 The 
intuition behind this Bayesian adjustment is that it is less likely that a fund will genuinely generate high 
alphas if all other funds generate relatively low alphas during the same period.19 Using a similar 
argument, Cohen, Coval and Pastor (2005) attribute a higher skill level to fund managers who produce 
their outperformance with a similar strategy to other skilled fund managers in comparison with managers 
who used a completely different strategy. The latter are classified as lucky rather than skilled. 
                                                 
 
17 Further technical details are given in Huij and Verbeek (2007). 
18 This also reduces a potential market-climate-bias of the alpha due to omitted risk factors. We thank Hendrik Scholz 
for pointing this out. 
19 Moreover, as the betas of the underlying stocks change randomly over time, funds with similar holdings should be 
affected by these fluctuations to a similar degree. 
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Evaluation   In the evaluation period, we investigate the investment performance of the deciles 
and decile subgroups. Funds that drop out of the portfolios due to merger or closure remain in the decile 
until their last month of operation and then the portfolio weights are readjusted accordingly to avoid any 
look-ahead bias.20,21 We used three models to evaluate performance. The first is the four-factor Carhart 
model as specified in equation (2). The second is a five-factor model that adds a mean reversion factor22 
to the Carhart model: if winner funds hold on to winner stocks for another one or two years, these winner 
stocks might eventually experience mean reversion in returns (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987). The 
third is a five-factor model that adds a liquidity factor23 to the Carhart model on the grounds that fund 
flows might also affect portfolio liquidity. We also analyzed performance based on raw returns as an 
additional robustness test in case a potentially omitted factor in the model used for formation and 
evaluation biases the results. However, we only present the four-factor model results and comment on 
the other specifications if they provide additional insights. 
Pooled regressions   We also perform a pooled regression with the difference in annualized 
performance between the evaluation year and the formation year as the dependent variable. These 
performance changes over time are then regressed on a set of control variables, including net inflows and 
a manager change dummy. This regression offers insights into the impact of fund flows and manager 
changes on fund performance over time. Furthermore, it provides us with the opportunity not only of 
                                                 
 
20 Carhart (1997) defines look-ahead bias as the bias that results from eliminating funds from the sample that fail to 
survive a minimum period of time after the ranking period. 
21 Assuming, in case of a merger, that all investors of the acquired funds subsequently hold the acquiring funds by 
“following the money” does not alter our conclusions (the evidence for this is not reported but available from the authors 
on request). 
22 This factor is based on six value-weighted portfolios formed on the size and prior returns of all NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks. A stock is classified as big (small) if its market capitalization is higher (lower) than the median of all 
NYSE firms. Past returns are measured over the previous four years lagged by one year, where “high returns” means 
higher than the 70th percentile and “low returns” means lower than the 30th percentile. The mean reversion factor is 
then the average of the low-prior-return portfolios minus the high-prior-return portfolios in both size groups. We thank 
Kenneth French for providing these data on his website. 
23 We thank Lubos Pastor for providing these data on his website.  
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separating the effects of fund flows and manager changes, but also of measuring their marginal impact 
and their interaction with other fund characteristics. 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Ranked Portfolio Tests 
We begin the presentation of our results by discussing the characteristics and performance of the fund 
deciles. The three top-ranked fund deciles have significantly positive alphas in the formation year, while 
the bottom five deciles significantly underperform the four-factor benchmark (Table 2). The spread 
between the top and bottom decile is a significant 1.86 percentage points per month. We find some 
evidence of mean reversion in fund performance in both winner and loser funds, particularly the former. 
In the evaluation period, the alphas of the three highest deciles are insignificantly different from zero, 
while the bottom three deciles continue to significantly underperform, although their performance levels 
improve considerably in comparison with the formation period. The monthly performance of winner 
funds decreases by an average of 0.81 percentage points between the formation and evaluation periods to 
0.07 percent in the evaluation period. Loser-fund performance improves from -0.97 to -0.24 percent per 
month between the formation and evaluation periods, a change of 0.73 percentage points. The spread 
between winner and loser funds is reduced to 0.32 percentage points in the evaluation period: since this 
spread is just statistically significant, we conclude that there is still some degree of performance 
persistence after one year. A similar pattern of mean reversion emerges for raw returns (Figure 2). 
[ Please insert Table 2 and Figure 2 about here ] 
This residual spread of 0.32 percentage points per month can partly be attributed to higher fees 
and to potentially higher transaction costs arising from the higher turnover of decile-1 funds compared 
with decile-10 funds: see Table 3.24 This table shows that the outperforming deciles, in particular, the 
                                                 
 
24 Indeed, gross of management fees, the spread between winner and loser funds shrinks to an insignificant 0.28 
percentage points (these results are not reported, but are available from the authors on request). 
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winner-decile-10 funds, have high net inflows, consistent with investors chasing past performance. 
These winner funds have inflows of 14.52 million USD per month in the evaluation period, but they also 
experienced high inflows in the formation period, with mean absolute inflows of 10.71 million USD per 
month. This suggests that some investors – the more sophisticated ones – have quicker reaction times 
than others. Decile-10 funds are amongst the second smallest size groups during the formation period, 
with an average size of 757.58 million USD. This is consistent with the results of Chen et al. (2004) that 
only small funds are able to beat the benchmark.25 However, as a result of inflows and capital 
appreciation, winner funds grow to an average size of 1,059.93 million USD in the evaluation period 
which is larger than the average of the funds in any of the bottom five performing deciles. Loser funds, 
by contrast, experience only modest average outflows of 1.23 million USD in the formation period and 
only slightly larger outflows of 4.05 million USD in the evaluation period, indicating some form of 
investor inertia. The average size of loser funds remains virtually unchanged between the formation 
period (at 684.31 million USD) and the evaluation period (at 673.59 million USD).  
Comparing the fund flows of median winner and loser funds, instead of average funds, reveals 
that fund flow levels are roughly equal and opposite between winner and loser funds, especially in the 
evaluation period. This suggests that the asymmetric flow response to positive and negative performance 
documented in the previous literature might be driven by extreme inflows into a small number of winner 
funds.26  
Having established that performance persistence is mean reverting amongst both winner funds 
and loser funds, we now investigate how fund flows and manager changes influence this.  
[ Please insert Table 3 about here ] 
                                                 
 
25 The fact that decile-1-loser funds are also the smallest funds indicates that being a small fund is not sufficient to beat 
the benchmark. 
26 Indeed, recent studies document that investors are now more likely to respond to bad performance by withdrawing 
money (O’Neal, 2004; Ivković and Weisbenner, 2009). 
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4.2 Winner Funds 
The effect of fund flows   Winner funds are separated by our second sorting into a subgroup with low 
absolute net inflows, averaging -4.50 million USD per month during the formation period, and a 
subgroup with high absolute net inflows, averaging 25.78 million USD per month (Table 4). The fraction 
of managers leaving winner funds is similar for both subgroups.  
[ Please insert Table 4 about here ] 
In terms of investment performance, winner funds which suffer from high absolute net inflows 
generate negative, though insignificant monthly alphas, of -0.05 percent in the evaluation year (Table 5). 
Winner funds which do not experience large absolute inflows have higher, though still insignificant, 
alphas in the evaluation year of 0.16 percent. The spread between the two subgroups conditioned on 
absolute net inflows is a significant 0.21 percentage points. Moreover, comparing the degree of mean 
reversion, defined as the difference in alphas between the formation and the evaluation period, reveals 
that the performance of the high-inflow subgroup moves towards the mean by -0.99 percentage points, 
while the low-inflow subgroup moves by only -0.67 percentage points. Figure 3 shows that conditioning 
on fund flows helps to predict both differences in future performance and in the degree of mean 
reversion. More extreme inflows lead to even stronger results.27 We therefore have clear evidence 
indicating that fund flows explain the lack of performance persistence among winner funds, confirming 
the Berk and Green (2004) hypothesis.  
[ Please insert Table 5 and Figure 3 about here ] 
                                                 
 
27 We repeated the analysis by defining high-inflow funds as those with net inflows exceeding the 80th percentile and 
low-inflow funds as those with net inflows below the 20th decile (instead of using the median as the split point). Funds in 
the high-inflow subgroup, on average, experience net inflows of 57.63 million USD compared with -10.79 million USD 
net inflows for the low-inflow subgroup. The performance of high-inflow funds is reduced to an insignificant -0.17 
percent (compared with -0.05 percent for the median split point). The spread between winner funds with low net inflows 
and high inflows amounts to a highly significant 0.30 percent, indicating the importance of extreme inflows as an 
equilibrating mechanism. 
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Winner funds with low absolute net inflows have an average size of 507.53 million USD which 
is only about half the size of winner funds with high absolute net inflows (1041.47 million USD). Thus, 
part of the difference in performance might be explained by differences in size rather than flows.28 To 
test this, we analyze the results from a second sorting based on relative fund flows. The two subgroups 
are now closer in size and the low-relative-inflow subgroup is actually larger (816.61 versus 733.99 
million USD). However, the basic conclusions remain the same: the low-net-inflow subgroup 
outperforms the high-net-inflow subgroup by a significant 0.16 percentage points per month. Both, 
absolute and relative capacity constraints seem to matter for winner funds. 
Bris et al. (2007) report that funds which close to new investors after a period of superior 
performance switch from average four-factor alphas of 0.96 percent per month to 0.15 percent, a 
significant decrease of 0.81 percentage points. They interpret this result as evidence against their good 
stewardship hypothesis which postulates that fund closures are intended to sustain good performance. By 
contrast, our results indicate that funds sheltered from inflows significantly outperform those 
experiencing inflows in the subsequent year. Thus, even though mean reversion in performance is 
present in all funds, the closure of a successful fund to new inflows can still make an important 
contribution to sustaining their superior performance (at least for another year). 
The effect of manager changes   We find evidence supporting the hypothesis relating to 
manager changes. Winner-decile-10 funds that lose their skilled manager generate an insignificant 
average monthly alpha of -0.02 percent. By contrast, winner funds that keep the same manager deliver 
positive, although still insignificant, alphas of 0.10 percent (see Figure 3). The spread of 0.12 percentage 
points, however, is statistically significant.29 The degree of mean reversion is also higher at -0.89 
                                                 
 
28 Note, however, that funds in the two smallest size groups of Chen et al. (2004) have an average fund size of only 4.7 
and 22.2 million USD, respectively, indicating that sorting on absolute fund flows leads to quite different results from 
sorting on fund size. 
29 Note that this figure might underestimate the true impact of manager turnover on performance because we cannot 
observe either the reason for a manager change or the quality of the new manager. For example, some skilled managers 
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percentage points in the case where the manager changes, compared with -0.79 percentage points for the 
subgroup without a manager change. Thus, manager change can also partly explain mean reversion 
among winner funds. But the magnitude of the manager-change channel in inducing mean reversion is 
slightly smaller than that for the inflow channel, consistent with the hypothesis in Section 2 above. 
Interaction effects   To examine the joint effect of fund flows and manager changes, we perform 
a double sort on both equilibrating mechanisms resulting in four subgroups. Table 6 reports the alphas 
for winner-decile subgroups conditioned on both mechanisms and the resulting spread portfolios. 
Winner funds experiencing neither inflows nor a manager change (weakly) significantly outperform the 
four-factor benchmark by 0.18 percentage points per month. This corresponds to a mean reversion of 
only -0.65 percentage points per month. By contrast, winner funds suffering from both high inflows and 
a manager change generate negative, although, insignificant alphas of -0.12 percent per month, a degree 
of mean reversion of -1.02 percentage points per month. The statistically significant spread of 0.30 
percentage points per month30 is only slightly lower than the sum of the individual effects.31 These 
results indicate that, in the case of winner funds, the two effects are additive and neither magnify nor 
offset each other in combination.  
[ Please insert Table 6 about here ] 
The double sorting also allows us to analyze marginal effects. The occurrence of a manager 
change seems to be independent of fund flows, since, on average, 22 percent of managers change each 
year in both subgroups with high and low net inflows (Table 4). The difference in fund flows between 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
might simply retire and be replaced by a new younger successor in the normal course of events and the IMCs of 
successful funds might be able to attract an above-average replacement in such circumstances. 
30 This is the evaluation-period alpha on the “10 low without – 10 high with” spread portfolio (Table 6). 
31 The sum of the individual effects is 0.33 and is given by the sum of the evaluation-period alpha of 0.21 on the “10 low 
– 10 high” spread portfolio (using absolute net inflows) and the evaluation-period alpha of 0.12 on the “10 without – 10 
with” spread portfolio (see Table 5). Figure 3 shows this graphically: 0.30 is the absolute sum of the first and fourth 
columns in the double-sorting segment of the “alpha” panel; 0.21 is the absolute sum of the two columns in the single-
sorting-by-flows segment of the “alpha” panel; and 0.12 is the absolute sum of the two columns in the single-sorting-by-
manager-change segment of the “alpha” panel. 
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winner funds without and those with a manager change is statistically significant but economically small 
at 4.49 million USD. As both mechanisms appear to be independent of each other, we would expect that 
controlling for one mechanism would not alter the impact of the other. This is indeed the case. 
Irrespective of whether the manager changes or not, fund flows have a significantly negative impact on 
performance of between 0.21 and 0.22 percentage points per month.32 When there is a manager change, 
alpha declines to an insignificant 0.07 percent for the low-inflow subgroup and to an equally 
insignificant 0.09 percent for the high-inflow subgroup.33 Comparing the subgroups “10 low with” and 
“10 high without” allows a comparison of the strength of both mechanisms. The statistically significant 
monthly spread of 0.13 percentage points again confirms that, among winner funds, fund flows is a more 
important equilibrium mechanism than manager change. Figure 3 also reveals a monotonic decrease in 
alphas between the two extreme subgroups, with fund flows again having the stronger impact on 
performance than manager changes. 
To summarize, the results for winner funds lend strong support to the hypothesis of Berk and 
Green (2004) that fund flows is a key mechanism bringing active mutual fund outperformance back into 
equilibrium where expected abnormal returns are zero. However, another equilibrating mechanism, 
manager changes also contribute to this effect. As expected, winner funds subject to both mechanisms 
simultaneously experience the largest performance deterioration. Conditioning on both mechanisms 
explains 37 percent34 of the unconditional mean reversion of winner funds. Fund flows are, however, a 
more important equilibrating mechanism than manager changes. Nevertheless, the two effects are 
additive. 
                                                 
 
32 This result is based on a comparison of the “10 low without” and “10 high without” subgroups and a comparison of 
the “10 low with” and “10 high with” subgroups, respectively. 
33 In unreported results, we find that, for the high-relative-net-inflow subgroup, the spread between funds without and 
with a manager change is a significant 0.15 percentage points per month. 
34 This is the ratio of the evaluation-period alpha of 0.30 on the “10 low without – 10 high with” spread portfolio (Table 
6) to the absolute degree of mean reversion of 0.81 on winner funds between the formation and evaluation periods 
(Table 2). 
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4.3 Loser funds 
The effect of fund flows   The second sorting on absolute net inflows divides loser funds into a 
subgroup with low net inflows, experiencing average monthly net inflows of -10.72 million USD, and a 
subgroup with high net inflows of 8.15 million USD (Table 7). The low-net-inflow funds are larger than 
the high-net-inflow funds during the formation period, 792.06 million USD compared with 593.03 
million USD. This difference is evened out by subsequent differences in fund flows, resulting in a 
difference in size of only 20.62 million USD in the evaluation period. There are no notable differences in 
characteristics between the subgroups with and without a manager change. 
[ Please insert Table 7 about here ] 
Conditioning on absolute fund flows, we find that loser funds with outflows have significant 0.12 
percentage points per month higher raw returns in the evaluation period than loser funds with inflows, 
revealing the impact of external governance (Table 8). However, comparing raw returns with four-factor 
and five-factor alphas reveals that this spread is partly explained by differences in risk exposures: loser 
funds with outflows appear to hold on to both momentum loser stocks, which continue to underperform, 
and long-term winner stocks, which exhibit mean reversion, to a much smaller extent than loser funds 
without significant outflows, i.e., manager inertia is much more prevalent in the latter case.35 Further, 
Figure 4 shows that the alphas of loser funds that benefit from outflows are only slightly higher than the 
alphas of loser funds without significant outflows and both subgroups continue to significantly 
underperform.36 Consequently, the predictions of Berk and Green (2004) on the fund-flow mechanism 
operating amongst loser funds do not find strong support in our data. 
[ Please insert Table 8 and Figure 4 about here ] 
                                                 
 
35 These results are not reported in the tables but are available from the authors on request.  
36 The results for the sorting on relative net inflows are similar though slightly weaker and not significant, implying that 
absolute changes in fund size are more relevant in improving loser-fund performance. 
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A standard explanation for the weak support for the Berk and Green (2004) hypothesis for loser 
funds is that a large fraction of investors are reluctant to withdraw money (Berk and Tonks, 2007). 
Indeed, the difference in average fund flows between the low- and high-fund-flow subgroups of loser 
funds is only about two-thirds as large as the same difference for winner funds (18.87 million USD 
versus 30.28 million USD).37 Therefore, the external incentive for poorly performing fund managers to 
change their portfolios and improve performance is not a powerful one.38 This behavior is consistent 
with the disposition effect, whereby investors are hesitant to realize losses and so stay invested in the 
hope that the fund price eventually returns to the original purchase price. Investors perhaps hope that the 
equilibrating mechanisms will work without them having to incur any additional effort or costs. In the 
presence of transaction costs and some degree of mean reversion, few investors will be willing to be 
early sellers. But, our results show that staying invested in loser funds is a sub-optimal strategy, since 
performance remains negative, while investors could alternatively earn 0.18 percent abnormal monthly 
returns by switching to previous-year winner funds with lower inflows and no manager change, an 
additional return likely to be sufficient to cover switching costs.  
To test whether a stronger response by investors would improve loser-fund performance even 
more, we repeat the above analysis, but focus only on loser funds being in the highest or lowest net-
inflow quintiles instead of using the median as a split point. The general conclusion remains the same.39 
Thus, even if investors do withdraw significant amounts of money from loser funds, we find little 
support for the Berk and Green (2004) hypothesis. The reason seems to be a failure of the manager to 
                                                 
 
37 Median differences are not reported in the tables but reveal a similar picture. 
38 Berk and Tonks (2007) compare this with the repayment behavior of mortgage borrowers. Some borrowers are 
sensitive to changes in the interest rate and refinance their mortgage whenever it is beneficial, while a significant 
proportion is reluctant to refinance. 
39 Specifically, we repeat the analysis defining high-inflow funds as those with net inflows exceeding the 80th percentile 
and low-inflow funds as those with net inflows below the 20th decile. Funds in the low-absolute-inflow subgroup have 
net inflows of -23.27 million USD, on average, during the formation year (compared with only -10.72 million USD 
when the median is used as the split point). However, the performance of the subgroup of loser funds with more extreme 
absolute outflows remains significantly negative at -0.18 percent per month and the spread between low and high net 
inflows increases to 0.14 percentage points, although this is still insignificant. 
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take appropriate actions, rather than the reluctance of fund investors to withdraw money. In addition, the 
higher transaction costs associated with forced asset sales is likely to contribute to the weak performance 
reversal after outflows. Moreover, this implies that the underperformance of loser funds is explained by 
a lack of good ideas, rather than the level of average transaction costs, because the latter should be 
reduced after a decrease in fund size. 
The effect of manager changes   Turning to manager changes, our hypothesis that bottom funds 
which sack their fund manager can improve their performance in the following year compared with 
bottom funds which stick with their presumably unskilled manager is strongly supported by our findings. 
While loser funds without a change of manager continue to significantly underperform by -0.26 percent 
per month in the subsequent year, loser funds that replace their manager have insignificant alphas of 
-0.18 percent per month (see Figure 4). This leads to a significant spread in alpha of 0.08 percentage 
points per month due to the exercise of internal governance and implies that internal governance is 
effective among loser funds.40 The spread in raw returns is even larger – a highly significant 0.11 
percent. A new manager, therefore, might contribute to stronger mean reversion of fund performance 
towards equilibrium levels by selling off loser stocks and realigning the portfolio. This evidence 
suggests that manager changes are an important equilibrating mechanism that has both a statistically and 
economically significant impact on fund performance.  
Interaction effects   An IMC might fire an underperforming manager to avoid the risk of 
investors withdrawing funds. Table 9 investigates the interaction and dependency between the two 
equilibrating mechanisms and fund performance. A comparison of the characteristics of the subgroups 
reveals that the internal and external governance mechanisms interact positively: funds with outflows 
have a higher fraction of manager changes than funds with positive net inflows and funds with a 
manager change have larger outflows than funds without (Table 7). If internal and external governance 
                                                 
 
40 Again, this figure might underestimate the true effect of forced manager turnover on performance, because not all 
manager changes are performance related. 
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were independent of each other, we would expect their combined impact on fund performance to be the 
sum of the individual effects. However, funds that benefit from both mechanisms have insignificant 
alphas of -0.09 percent per month in the evaluation period. This corresponds to an impressive degree of 
mean reversion of 0.90 percentage points per month. Funds without either form of governance 
mechanism continue to significantly underperform by -0.29 percent per month, regressing to the mean 
by only 0.67 percentage points per month. The spread between both subgroups is a highly significant 
0.20 percentage points per month41 which is larger than the sum of the individual effects.42 This implies 
that the internal and external governance mechanisms are magnified when they operate jointly in loser 
funds, as can be seen from an examination of Figure 4.43  
[ Please insert Table 9 about here ] 
Turning to marginal effects, within the subgroup of funds with outflows, those with a manager 
change have a significant 0.15 percentage points higher average alpha than those without a manager 
change, while the difference for the funds without outflows is close to zero. Fund managers who stay on 
do not seem to use the outflows to reorganize their portfolio, but merely to scale down existing 
investments. Again, an explanation for this behavior could be a disposition effect among loser-fund 
managers. Even more interestingly, within the group of loser funds with a manager change, those funds 
that experience large absolute outflows have alphas that are significantly higher by 0.18 percentage 
points per month than those without outflows. Thus, the poor effectiveness of the fund-flow channel 
based on the single sorting is almost entirely explained by the subgroup without a manager change. 
                                                 
 
41 This is the evaluation-period alpha on the “1 low with – 1 high without” spread portfolio (Table 9). 
42 The sum of the individual effects is 0.17 and is given by the sum of the evaluation-period alpha of 0.09 on the “1 low 
– 1 high” spread portfolio (using absolute net inflows) and the evaluation-period alpha of 0.08 on the “1 with – 1 
without” spread portfolio (see Table 8). Figure 4 shows this graphically: 0.20 is the difference between the first and 
fourth columns in the double-sorting segment of the “alpha” panel; 0.09 is the difference between the two columns in the 
single-sorting-by-flows segment of the “alpha” panel; and 0.08 is the absolute sum of the two columns in the single-
sorting-by-manager-change segment of the “alpha” panel. 
43 Note, however, that on average less than 12 percent of all loser funds benefit from a combination of both governance 
mechanisms, explaining why studies not conditioning on fund flows and manager changes report, on average, persistent 
underperformance (differences due to rounding). 
  
 
27
In summary, we do not find much support for the Berk and Green (2004) hypothesis for loser 
funds when considering fund flows as the sole equilibrating mechanism. However, manager changes 
both separately and jointly with outflows play an important role in the governance process, leading to a 
significant improvement in the performance of loser funds. Applying internal and external governance at 
the same time not only brings performance levels back to equilibrium (-0.09) in the evaluation period, 
but also explains 27 percent44 of the unconditional mean reversion among loser funds. Manager changes 
are a much more effective governance tool than withdrawing money, especially when transactions cost 
associated with the latter are taken into account, and, when used in combination, the effects are 
magnified. 
4.4 Impact of fees 
The evidence we have presented above in the case of winner funds is consistent with efforts by winner-
fund managers to maximize their fees by increasing their AUM either at the same fund (i.e., higher-than-
median inflows) or by moving to another fund (i.e., manager change), as discussed in Section 2. But 
winner-fund managers might also strategically adjust fee levels to past performance. By contrast, loser 
funds experiencing a high degree of both internal and external governance might charge lower fees to 
reflect their lower skills.45 To investigate this, we repeated the above analysis using pre-fee returns.46 
However, our conclusions based on either single or double sorting on fund flows and manager changes 
do not change in the case of either winner or loser funds.  
We conclude that winner-fund managers do not attempt to maximize their fee income by actively 
adjusting the fee levels to their expected performance and that the benefits of outflows and manager 
                                                 
 
44 This is the ratio of the evaluation-period alpha of 0.20 on the “1 low with – 1 high without” spread portfolio (Table 9) 
to the absolute degree of mean reversion of 0.73 on loser funds between the formation and evaluation periods (Table 2). 
45 In addition to fees, cross-sectional differences in trading costs might explain part of the spreads between the different 
deciles and decile subgroups. However, even though we have information on portfolio turnover, we do not know the 
differences in the levels of transaction costs and these might be large across funds depending on the investment style, 
especially with respect to a small cap tilt. Thus, the data does not allow us to control for cross-sectional differences in 
total trading costs. However, we control for differences in turnover in our regression tests. 
46 The results are not reported in tables, but available from the authors on request. 
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changes among loser funds are not related to differences in fees. This demonstrates that the performance 
impact of the equilibrating mechanisms documented in the previous section is robust to potential 
differences in fee levels. Furthermore, based on a comparison of gross and net returns and the magnitude 
of the performance impact of both equilibrating mechanisms, we conclude that the equilibrating 
mechanisms are more relevant in explaining below-average performance than the impact of fees. 
4.5 Regression Analysis 
Model specification   In this section, we examine the output from a pooled regression of the change in 
annualized Bayesian four-factor alphas between the formation and evaluation periods on relative net 
inflows, manager changes and a set of other control variables documented in the literature as having an 
impact on performance.47 We focus on relative flows in this section because they are more comparable 
across funds. The aims are threefold: first, by controlling for other determinants of mutual fund 
performance, we are able to measure the marginal impact of fund flows and manager changes, as well as 
the interaction with other control variables; second, it allows us to analyze the performance impact of 
both equilibrating mechanisms over time (i.e., whether they lead to mean reversion), in contrast with the 
cross-sectional results in the previous sections using ranked portfolio tests; and third, it serves as a 
robustness check. 
In our first model, we include the following additional control variables: fund size (total net 
assets), fund fees, fund age and the portfolio turnover ratio.48 49 Because there is a strong tendency for 
the extremes in fund performance to revert to the mean, we add to our regression two dummy variables 
                                                 
 
47 Following French (2008), we winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentile to avoid any bias resulting from 
extreme outliers. 
48 The portfolio turnover ratio is defined as the minimum of aggregated sales and aggregated purchases of securities, 
divided by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund. It measures the fraction of the portfolio traded over the 
previous 12 months. 
49 Chen et al. (2004) and Cremers and Petajisto (2009) find a negative effect of fund size on performance; Carhart (1997) 
documents a negative effect from fees; Huij and Verbeek (2007) and Karoui and Meier (2009) report an outperformance 
of young funds. Results on turnover are ambiguous. Elton et al. (1993) and Carhart (1997) find a negative relation, 
Wermers (2000) documents that turnover is not associated with fund performance and Dahlquist, Engstroem and 
Soederlind (2000) and Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000) find a positive relationship. 
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that indicate whether a fund is currently in decile 10 or decile 1 based on previous-year performance. 
These dummies capture the pure mean reversion effect and ensure that the other coefficients are not 
biased. The key variables of interest are net inflows and the manager change dummy. We also include an 
interaction term between fund flows and the decile-10 and decile-1 dummies in order to analyze the 
differential effects of fund flows on performance in the top and bottom funds. Similarly, we use a 
manager-change dummy indicating whether the fund manager has been replaced during the previous 
year and an interaction term between manager change and the decile-10 and decile-1 dummies.  
In a second model, we analyze the impact of being a small-cap or a sector fund on performance 
and the marginal impact of fund flows on winner and loser funds that belong to these two investment-
style categories. We anticipate that capacity constraints are more prevalent in narrow and illiquid 
markets and, as a result, fund flows have a stronger impact on performance in these investment 
categories. A third model investigates the interaction effect between a change in the manager of a winner 
or loser fund and the fund being a member of a large fund family. Gervais, Lynch and Musto (2005) 
argue that the replacement of an underperforming manager in a large fund family reveals more 
information than the replacement of a manager in a small fund family. We assign a fund to the large-
family group if the number of funds offered by its fund family at the end of the previous year is higher 
than the 70th percentile. A fourth model assesses the interaction between the manager-change and fund-
flow mechanisms. Specifically, we include a dummy for winner funds that have higher-than-median net 
inflows and a change in manager and a dummy for loser funds that have lower-than-median net inflows 
(i.e., high net outflows) and a change in manager.50  
Empirical Results   As we measure the change in performance between consecutive years, a 
significant coefficient on one of the control variables would indicate that there was a trend in 
                                                 
 
50 In an additional unreported regression, we included year dummies into the analysis. However, as the alphas are 
already adjusted for general market movements, our results are not qualitatively different. Furthermore, using Newey-
West standard errors does not alter our conclusions. These results are available from the authors on request. 
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performance over time. An examination of the first four regressors in Table 10 indicates that, across all 
models, only fund size (as measured by total net assets) is statistically significant. The decile-1 and 
decile-10 dummies are both highly significant and indicate that loser funds improve their alphas by 
between 7.93 and 7.94 percentage points in the following year, depending on the model, while the alphas 
of winner funds deteriorate by between 8.21 and 8.31 percentage points in the following year, before 
conditioning on any other variable. These findings indicating strong mean reversion are consistent with 
the results of the portfolio tests.  
[ Please insert Table 10 about here ] 
In line with the hypothesis of Berk and Green (2004), we document a significant negative 
relationship between relative net inflows and subsequent performance. A one percent increase in relative 
net inflows during the previous year decreases four-factor alphas for all funds by 1.06 percentage points 
on average in the following year. Model 1 reveals that the decrease becomes 1.48 percentage points for 
winner funds which confirms the results of the ranked portfolio test. Controlling for a fund’s market 
segment shows that performance decreases by an additional 0.86 percentage points if the winner fund is 
a small-cap or sector fund and receives high inflows (Models 2-4). This supports the notion that capacity 
constraints are partly driven by transaction costs.  
A manager change does not have a significant impact on the average fund, but if the manager of 
a winner-decile-10 fund changes, performance subsequently deteriorates by a significant 1.15 to 1.30 
percentage points in the following year, according to Models 1-3. The more sophisticated Model 4 
shows that the effect operates through fund flows: winner funds that lose their manager, while also 
experiencing above-median net inflows, experience an average deterioration in performance of 2.29 
percentage points in the following year. If the star manager of a large fund family leaves, the effect is not 
significantly different from the case in which the manager of a small fund family leaves, implying that 
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not even large fund families have access to the fund management skills that would prevent the 
deterioration in performance following the loss of a talented manager. 
For loser funds, the improvement in alpha following an increase in relative outflows is not 
significantly different from the general performance improvement for average-performing funds (Model 
1), implying that the performance of loser funds is less sensitive to a change in net flows of the same 
magnitude than the performance of winner funds. Further, being a small-cap or sector fund has little 
effect on the relationship between outflows and subsequent performance (Model 2). The improvement in 
performance following a manager change, although positive, is insignificant for a typical loser fund, 
according to Models 1 and 2. However, the more sophisticated Models 3 and 4 reveal that replacing an 
underperforming manager in a fund belonging to a large fund family improves performance significantly 
by an additional 2.71 to 2.92 percentage points in the following year. This result supports the predictions 
of Gervais, Lynch and Musto (2005) that manager replacement in a large family contains more 
information, particularly if it is associated with an underperforming manager. Model 4 additionally 
shows a strong interaction between the two equilibrating mechanisms: if loser funds sack their manager, 
while also experiencing above-median outflows, they experience an aggregate performance 
improvement of 3.00 percentage points the following year – although this is attenuated by a deterioration 
of 1.80 percentage points as a result of the pure effect of a change in manager in a bottom-performing 
fund. This supports the findings from the ranked portfolio tests 
Thus, the results in this section strongly confirm the Berk and Green (2004) hypothesis for fund 
flows as a predictor of mean reversion in performance over time for winner funds (and, indeed, the 
average fund), but not for loser funds. The effect of manager change is driven by the interaction with 
high net inflows for winner funds, and by the interactions with outflows and fund family size for loser 
funds. These interaction effects suggest that a change in manager has a magnified impact on 
performance in combination with fund flows, again reinforcing the evidence from the ranked portfolio 
tests. What is clear from all four models that, by itself, a change in manager has no effect on 
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performance: it is only in combination with fund flows (and, additionally, in the case of loser funds, with 
fund family size) that a change in manager has an impact. By contrast, relative fund flows have an 
independent (negative) impact on performance. 
5 Conclusions and Implications 
We have examined the role of fund flows and manager changes in explaining the lack of persistence in 
mutual fund performance. Using a CRSP sample of 3,946 actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds 
over the period from 1992 to 2007, we find that around 37 percent of the mean reversion in winner funds 
and 27 percent of the mean reversion in loser funds can be explained by these two equilibrating 
mechanisms. They are much more important in explaining below-average performance than, say, the 
impact of fees.  
In the case of winner funds, we provide support for the Berk and Green (2004) hypothesis that 
inflows of new money have a large impact on inducing mean reversion, and are more important than 
manager changes. Both methods combined can explain a spread in risk-adjusted performance of 0.30 
percent per month (3.60 percent per year). On the other hand, the impact of fund flows on performance 
is much weaker in the case of loser funds. Manager replacement is a more effective equilibrating 
mechanism than fund outflows, especially when transactions costs associated with the latter are taken 
into account. Indeed, the weak results for fund flows based on the single sorting of the data are almost 
entirely due to the subgroup without a manager change. In contrast, fund flows and manager changes 
acting together complement each other in the case of loser funds. When both governance mechanisms 
operate jointly, risk-adjusted performance of loser funds improves by 0.20 percent per month (2.40 
percent per year) compared to the subgroup of loser funds without any governance. This is greater than 
the sum of the individual effects. 
What are the potential implications of these findings? First of all, investors should pay close 
attention to fund flows and the resulting changes in fund size, as well as to the career paths of individual 
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fund managers amongst different funds: our results show that past performance is only an indicator of 
future performance if the manager is not replaced and fund flows do not eliminate the persistence. It 
would be valuable for investors if IMCs were required to publish information on fund flows on a regular 
basis and on manager changes immediately.  
Second, IMCs should make their best efforts to retain skilled managers. While this is an obvious 
statement to make, it implies that a stronger alignment of performance with remuneration might be 
necessary to avoid the high turnover of talented managers. Das and Sundaram (2002) have questioned 
the usefulness of US restrictions permitting only fulcrum fees as performance-related fee contracts. 
Hedge fund industry practice, which typically combines asymmetric performance fees with personal 
stakes by the fund manager, provides valuable lessons for the mutual fund industry. After a fund has 
been soft-closed by the IMC after a period of excessive inflows, it might be appropriate to allow the fund 
to switch from size-based fees to performance-based fees. Nohel, Wang and Zheng (2010) discuss the 
implications of allowing side-by-side management of hedge funds and mutual funds by the same 
manager as a way of retaining star fund managers. This privilege is usually only granted to the best 
performing managers and any agency conflicts do not seem to reduce mutual fund performance. Still, 
any improvement in the rewards to star fund managers will be at the expense of investors, again making 
it difficult for investors to benefit from any performance persistence. An important message from our 
findings is that star fund managers extract their skill-rents one way or another, even if that means 
changing jobs. 
Finally, with respect to loser funds, the IMC needs to respond more promptly in the face of poor 
performance. Since losing fund managers seem to be incapable of extricating themselves from their 
losing positions, the IMC needs to replace them much sooner than hitherto: the fund-flow mechanism is 
much less effective at loser funds if not accompanied by a change in the fund manager.  
  
 
34
References 
Alexander, Gordon J., Gjergji Cici and Scott Gibson. 2007. Does Motivation Matter When Assessing Trade 
Performance? An Analysis of Mutual Funds. Review of Financial Studies 20:125–150. 
Baks, Klaas P. 2006. On the Performance of Mutual Fund Managers. Working Paper, Emroy University. 
Berk, Jonathan B. and Richard C. Green. 2004. Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets. 
Journal of Political Economy 112:1269–1295. 
Berk, Jonathan B. and Ian Tonks. 2007. Return Persistence and Fund Flows in the Worst Performing Mutual 
Funds. Working Paper No. 13042, NBER. 
Bollen, Nicolas P. B. and Jeffrey A. Busse. 2005. Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. 
Review of Financial Studies 18:569–597. 
Bris, Arturo, Huseyin Gulen, Padma Kadiyala and P. Raghavendra Rau. 2007. Good Stewards, Cheap 
Talkers, or Family Men? The Impact of Mutual Fund Closures on Fund Managers, Flows, Fees, and 
Performance. Review of Financial Studies 20:953–982. 
Brown, Stephen J. and William N. Goetzmann. 1995. Performance Persistence. Journal of Finance 50:679–
698. 
Busse, Jeffrey A. and Paul J. Irvine. 2006. Bayesian Alphas and Mutual Fund Persistence. Journal of Finance 
61:2251–2288. 
Carhart, Mark M. 1997. On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. Journal of Finance 52:57–82. 
Carhart, Mark M., Jennifer N. Carpenter, Anthony W. Lynch and David K. Musto. 2002. Mutual Fund 
Survivorship. Review of Financial Studies 15:1439–1463. 
Carpenter, Jennifer N. and Anthony W. Lynch. 1999. Survivorship Bias and Attrition Effects in Measures of 
Performance Persistence. Journal of Financial Economics 54: 337–374. 
Chen, Hsiu-Lang, Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Russ Wermers. 2000. The Value of Active Mutual Fund 
Management: An Examination of the Stockholdings and Trades of Fund Managers. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35:343–368. 
Chen, Joseph, Harrison Hong, Ming Huang and Jeffrey D. Kubik. 2004. Does Fund Size Erode Mutual Fund 
Performance? The Role of Liquidity and Organization. American Economic Review 94:1276–1302. 
Chevalier, Judith and Glenn Ellison. 1999a. Are Some Mutual Fund Managers Better Than Others? Cross-
Sectional Patterns in Behavior and Performance. Journal of Finance 54:875–899. 
Chevalier, Judith and Glenn Ellison. 1999b. Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 114:389–432. 
Cohen, Randolph B., Joshua D. Coval and Lubos Pastor. 2005. Judging Fund Managers by the Company 
They Keep. Journal of Finance 60:1057–1096. 
Cooper, Michael J., Huseyin Gulen and P. Raghavendra Rau. 2005. Changing Names with Style: Mutual 
Fund Name Changes and Their Effects on Fund Flows. Journal of Finance 60:2825–2858. 
Coval, Joshua and Erik Stafford. 2007. Asset Fire Sales (and Purchases) in Equity Markets. Journal of 
Financial Economics 86:479–512. 
Cremers, Martijn and Antti Petajisto. 2009. How Active is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure that 
Predicts Performance. Review of Financial Studies 22:3329–3365. 
Dahlquist, Magnus, Stefan Engström and Paul Söderlind. 2000. Performance and Characteristics of Swedish 
Mutual Funds. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35:409–423. 
Dangl, Thomas, Youchang Wu and Josef Zechner. 2008. Market Discipline and Internal Governance in the 
Mutual Fund Industry. Review of Financial Studies 21:2307–2343. 
  
 
35
Das, Sanjiv Ranjan and Rangarajan K. Sundaram. 2002. Fee Speech: Signaling, Risk-Sharing, and the Impact 
of Fee Structures on Investor Welfare. Review of Financial Studies 15:1465–1497. 
De Bondt, Werner F. M. and Richard Thaler. 1985. Does the Stock Market Overreact?. Journal of Finance 
40:793–805. 
De Bondt, Werner F. M. and Richard Thaler. 1987. Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock 
Market Seasonality. Journal of Finance 52:557–581. 
Del Guercio, Diane and Paula A. Tkac. 2008. Star Power: The Effect of Morningstar Ratings on Mutual Fund 
Flow. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming. 
Ding, Bill and Russ Wermers. 2006. Mutual Fund Performance and Governance Structure: The Role of 
Portfolio Managers and Boards of Directors. Working paper, University of Maryland. 
Edelen, Roger M. 1999. Investor Flows and the Assessed Performance of Open-End Mutual Funds. Journal 
of Financial Economics 53:439–466. 
Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber and Christopher R. Blake. 1996a. The Persistence of Risk-Adjusted Mutual 
Fund Performance. Journal of Business 69:133–157. 
Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber and Christopher R. Blake. 1996b. Survivorship Bias and Mutual Fund 
Performance. Review of Financial Studies 9:1097–1120. 
Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber, Das Sanjiv and Matthew Hvlaka. 1993. Efficiency with Costly 
Information: A Reinterpretation of Evidence from Managed Portfolios. Review of Financial Studies 
6:1–22. 
Evans, Richard B. 2010. Mutual Fund Incubation. Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French. 1993. Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds. 
Journal of Financial Economics 33:3–56. 
French, Kenneth R. 2008. Presidential Address: The Cost of Active Investing. Journal of Finance 63:1537–
1573. 
Gallagher, David R. and Prashanthi Nadarajah. 2004. Top Management Turnover: An Analysis of Active 
Australian Investment Managers. Australian Journal of Management 29:243–274. 
Gervais, Simon, Anthony W. Lynch and David K. Musto. 2005. Fund Families as Delegated Monitors of 
Money Managers. Review of Financial Studies 18:1139–1169. 
Goriaev, Alexei, Theo E. Nijman and Bas J. M. Werker. 2008. Performance Information Dissemination in the 
Mutual Fund Industry. Journal of Financial Markets 11:144–159. 
Gruber, Martin J. 1996. Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds. Journal of Finance 
51:783–810. 
Hendricks, Darryll, Jayendu Patel and Richard Zeckhauser. 1993. Hot Hands in Mutual Funds: Short-Run 
Persistence of Relative Performance. 1974–1988. Journal of Finance 48:93–130. 
Hu, Fan, Alastair R. Hall and Campbell R. Harvey. 2000. Promotion or Demotion? An Empirical 
Investigation of the Determinants of Top Mutual Fund Manager Change. Working paper, Duke 
University.  
Huij, Joop and Marno Verbeek. 2007. Cross-Sectional Learning and Short-Run Persistence in Mutual Fund 
Performance. Journal of Banking and Finance 31:973–997. 
Ivković, Zoran and Scott Weisbenner. 2009. Individual Investor Mutual Fund Flows. Journal of Financial 
Economics 92:223–237. 
Karoui, Aymen and Iwan Meier. 2009. The Performance and Characteristics of Mutual Fund Starts. 
European Journal of Finance 15:487–509. 
  
 
36
Keswani, Aneel and David Stolin. 2008. Which Money is Smart? Mutual Fund Buys and Sells of Individual 
and Institutional Investors. Journal of Finance 63:85–118. 
Khorana, Ajay. 1996. Top Management Turnover: An Empirical Investigation of Fund Managers. Journal of 
Financial Economics 40:403–427. 
Khorana, Ajay. 2001. Performance Changes Following Top Manager Turnover: Evidence from Open-End 
Mutual Funds. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36:371–393. 
Lunde, Asger, Allan Timmermann and David Blake. 1999. A Cox Regression Analysis. Journal of Empirical 
Finance 6:121–152. 
Lynch, Anthony W. and David K. Musto. 2003. How Investors Interpret Past Fund Returns. Journal of 
Finance 58:2033–2058. 
Massa, Massimo, Jonathan Reuter and Eric Zitzewitz. 2010. Why Should Firms Share Credit with 
Employees? Evidence from Anonymously Managed Mutual Funds. Journal of Financial Economics 
95:400–424. 
Nohel, Tom. Z., Jay Wang and Lu Zheng. 2010. Side-by-Side Management of Hedge Funds and Mutual 
Funds. Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming. 
O'Neal, Edward S., 2004. Purchase and Redemption Patterns of U. S. Equity Mutual Funds. Financial 
Management 33:63–90. 
Parrino, Robert, Richard W. Sias and Laura Starks. 2003. Voting with Their Feet: Institutional Ownership 
Changes Around Forced CEO Turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 68:3–46. 
Pastor, Lubos and Robert F. Stambaugh. 2002. Mutual Fund Performance and Seemingly Unrelated Assets. 
Journal of Financial Economics 61:315–349. 
Pastor, Lubos and Robert F. Stambaugh. 2003. Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns. Journal of 
Political Economy 111:642–685. 
Pollet, Joshua M. and Mungo Wilson. 2008. How Does Size Affect Mutual Fund Behavior?. Journal of 
Finance 63:2941–2969. 
Sapp, Travis and Ashish Tiwari. 2004. Does Stock Return Momentum Explain the “Smart Money” Effect?. 
Journal of Finance 59:2605–2622. 
Sawicki, Julian and Frank Finn. 2002. Smart Money and Small Funds. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 29:825–846. 
Shefrin, Hersh and Meir Statman. 1985. The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too 
Long: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance 40:777–790. 
Sirri, Erik R. and Peter Tufano. 1998. Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows. Journal of Finance 53: 1589–
1622. 
Tonks, Ian. 2005. Performance Persistence of Pension-Fund Managers. Journal of Business 78:1917–1942. 
Wermers, Russ. 2000. Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical Decomposition Into Stock-Picking Talent, 
Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses. Journal of Finance 55:1655–1695. 
Yan, Xuemin (Sterling). 2008. Liquidity, Investment Style, and the Effect of Fund Size on Fund 
Performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43:741-768. 
Zheng, Lu. 1999. Is Money Smart? A Study of Mutual Fund Investors' Fund Selection Ability. Journal of 
Finance 54:901-933. 
  
 
37
Appendix: Data Selection 
In constructing our sample, we follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and select only domestic equity 
funds. We exclude international funds, global funds, balanced funds, flexible funds, and funds of funds. 
We further drop all funds containing terms in their name that commonly refer to passive vehicles. We 
require our funds to have at least 12 months of return data available to be included in our sample. 
Additionally, we drop all observations prior to the IPO date given by CRSP and funds without names in 
order to account for a potential incubation bias (Evans 2010). This results in 3,948 funds that existed at 
some time during our sample period from 1992 to 2007. Different share classes of the same fund have 
the same manager and fund flows of individual share classes might cancel out at the portfolio level. 
Hence, we combine all share classes that belong to the same fund and have the same underlying portfolio 
to one observation. We use a matching algorithm that combines information from the fund's name and 
the portfolio number variable given by CRSP.51 Fund characteristics such as the investment objective or 
the first offer date are taken from the oldest share class, whereas quantitative information is either 
summed up, such as total net assets, or we take the weighted average over all share classes, such as 
returns and fees. If two share classes of the same funds have different manager change dates, we use the 
most recent date. We classify the funds in our sample into three groups: (1) Large and mid-cap funds 
(LMC), (2) small-cap funds (SC) and (3) sector funds (SEC). Because ICDI classification codes are no 
longer available in the 2008 cut off of the CRSP mutual fund database, we modify the selection criteria 
of Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) as follows. For our classification, we use Lipper codes, Wiesenberger 
codes and Strategic Insight codes (priority is given in that order if different codes are not consistent). 
Details are given in Table 11. A fund is assigned to one of the three groups for the total sample period if 
it belonged to this group for at least 50 percent of the observations in our sample period. 
[ Please insert Table 11 about here ] 
                                                 
 
51 A matching solely based on the portfolio number variable is not possible, as this variable is available only from 
December 1998 onwards. 
F
ig
u
re
1:
P
or
tf
ol
io
fo
rm
at
io
n
T
h
is
fi
gu
re
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
ol
og
y
w
e
ap
p
ly
to
co
n
st
ru
ct
th
e
su
b
g
ro
u
p
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
s.
F
u
n
d
s
a
re
fi
rs
t
so
rt
ed
in
to
d
ec
il
es
b
a
se
d
o
n
th
ei
r
p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
in
th
e
fo
rm
at
io
n
p
er
io
d
.
T
h
en
,
th
e
w
in
n
er
(d
ec
il
e
10
)
an
d
lo
se
r
(d
ec
il
e
1)
fu
n
d
s
a
re
fu
rt
h
er
d
iv
id
ed
in
to
:
(a
)
a
lo
w
-n
et
-i
n
fl
ow
(h
ig
h
-n
et
-i
n
fl
ow
)
su
b
g
ro
u
p
if
th
e
n
et
in
fl
ow
s
in
th
e
fo
rm
at
io
n
p
er
io
d
ar
e
lo
w
er
(h
ig
h
er
)
th
an
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
n
et
in
fl
ow
s
of
th
e
d
ec
il
e
w
h
ic
h
th
e
fu
n
d
s
b
el
o
n
g
to
(w
e
u
se
ei
th
er
a
b
so
lu
te
n
et
in
fl
ow
s
o
r
re
la
ti
ve
n
et
in
fl
ow
s
a
n
d
p
re
se
n
t
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
b
ot
h
);
(b
)
a
w
it
h
ou
t
(w
it
h
)
m
an
ag
er
-c
h
an
ge
su
b
g
ro
u
p
if
th
e
m
a
n
a
g
er
re
m
a
in
ed
th
e
sa
m
e
(c
h
a
n
g
ed
)
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
p
er
io
d
;
a
n
d
(c
)
in
to
fo
u
r
su
b
g
ro
u
p
s
co
m
b
in
in
g
th
e
cr
it
er
ia
in
(a
)
an
d
(b
)
in
a
d
ou
b
le
so
rt
in
g
m
ec
h
a
n
is
m
.
(a
)
ab
so
lu
te
/
re
la
ti
ve
fl
ow
s
(b
)
m
an
ag
er
ch
an
ge
(c
)
d
ou
b
le
so
rt
in
g
D
ec
ile
 9
…
D
ec
ile
 2
10
 h
ig
h 
flo
w
s
(r
el
/a
bs
)
10
 lo
w
 fl
ow
s
(r
el
/a
bs
)
D
ec
ile
 1
0
(W
in
ne
r)
D
ec
ile
1
(L
os
er
)
1 
lo
w
 fl
ow
s
(r
el
/a
bs
)
1 
hi
gh
 fl
ow
s
(r
el
/a
bs
)
D
ec
ile
 9
…
D
ec
ile
 2
D
ec
ile
 1
0
(W
in
ne
r)
D
ec
ile
1
(L
os
er
)
10
 w
ith
ou
t
10
 w
ith
1 
w
ith
1 
w
ith
ou
t
   
10
 lo
w
  w
ith
ou
t
   
10
 lo
w
  w
ith
   
10
 h
ig
h 
w
ith
ou
t
   
10
 h
ig
h 
w
ith
D
ec
ile
 9
…
D
ec
ile
 2
   
1 
lo
w
  w
ith
   
1 
lo
w
  w
ith
ou
t
   
1 
hi
gh
 w
ith
   
1 
hi
gh
 w
ith
ou
t
D
ec
ile
 1
0
(W
in
ne
r)
D
ec
ile
1
(L
os
er
)
38
Figure 2: Mean reversion of fund performance
This figure presents the average monthly raw returns of the decile portfolios relative to the evaluation year (t).
Portfolios are formed based on previous-year Bayesian four-factor alphas.
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Figure 3: Average four-factor alphas for winner funds and winner-fund subgroups
This figure presents the four-factor alphas for winner funds and winner-fund subgroups based on a single
sorting and also a double sorting on absolute fund flows and / or manager change. The top panel presents the
level of performance (four-factor alpha) in the evaluation period and the bottom panel presents the change
in performance between the formation and evaluation periods (∆ alpha). Funds are assigned to the high-net-
inflow (high) or low-net-inflow (low) subgroup based on whether their net inflows during the formation period
are higher or lower than the median net inflows of all other funds in the same decile. Funds are assigned to the
manager-change (with) or no-manager-change (without) subgroup based on whether their fund manager changed
during the formation period. Portfolios are formed based on previous-year Bayesian four-factor alphas. ∗∗∗, ∗∗
and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors are used for the regression coefficients.
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Figure 4: Average four-factor alphas for loser funds and loser-fund subgroups
This figure presents the four-factor alphas for loser funds and loser-fund subgroups based on a single sorting
and also a double sorting on absolute fund flows and / or manager change. See the note to figure 3 for more
explanation.
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Table 1: Characteristics of funds in sample
This table presents the characteristics of the sample of funds for 48-month subperiods and for the whole period
from 1992 to 2007. We restrict our sample to funds that have at least 12 months of available return data and
information on the variable mgr date in the CRSP database. Row (1) reports the number of months in the
respective period; row (2) reports monthly (arithmetic) mean raw returns in excess of the rate on the risk-free
asset in percent; row (3) reports the average portfolio turnover in percent; row (4) reports average fees in
percent; row (5) reports the average age of the funds in years; row (6) reports the mean fund size in million
USD; row (7) reports monthly mean absolute fund flows in million USD; row (8) reports the number of funds
in existence; and row (9) reports the number of manager changes that occurred during this period.
subperiods whole period
1992–1995 1996–1999 2000–2003 2004–2007
# months 48 48 48 48 192
returns 0.72 1.36 -0.29 0.53 0.48
turnover 83.16 110.18 140.16 102.25 113.35
fees 1.68 1.64 1.67 1.56 1.63
age 11.72 9.91 9.81 11.99 10.80
size 461.42 853.36 849.27 1178.46 899.26
flows 4.99 4.56 2.36 0.71 2.70
# funds 1,622 2,628 3,286 3,312 3,946
# man ch 1,218 1,868 2,073 1,333 6,492
Table 2: Performance of decile portfolios
This table presents different performance measures for the decile portfolios 10 (winner) to 1 (loser) and a spread
portfolio long in decile-10 funds and short in decile-1 funds. Columns (1) and (2) report raw returns and
Bayesian four-factor alphas in the formation period; columns (3) and (4) report raw returns and four-factor
alphas in the evaluation period; column (5) presents the change in performance between the formation and
evaluation periods (∆ alpha). ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for the regression coefficients.
formation period evaluation period differences
raw return 4-factor α raw return 4-factor α ∆ 4-factor α
10 (winner) 1.65 0.88∗∗∗ 0.77 0.07 −0.81∗∗∗
9 1.07 0.43∗∗∗ 0.68 0.01 −0.43∗∗∗
8 0.85 0.25∗∗∗ 0.59 −0.05 −0.29∗∗∗
7 0.72 0.11 0.52 −0.11∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
6 0.64 −0.01 0.53 −0.10∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗
5 0.50 −0.12∗ 0.57 −0.09∗ 0.03
4 0.42 −0.24∗∗∗ 0.53 −0.11 0.13∗∗∗
3 0.27 −0.38∗∗∗ 0.49 −0.14∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
2 0.10 −0.56∗∗∗ 0.52 −0.16∗ 0.40∗∗∗
1 (loser) −0.31 −0.97∗∗∗ 0.45 −0.24∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
10 − 1 1.96∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 0.32 0.32∗ −
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Table 3: Characteristics of decile portfolios
This table presents the characteristics of the decile portfolios 10 (winner) to 1 (loser) and a spread portfolio long
in decile-10 funds and short in decile-1 funds. Panel (a) gives the results for the formation period and panel
(b) for the evaluation period. Columns (1) and (2) report the mean and median of fund size in million USD,
respectively; column (3) reports the average fund age in years; column (4) reports the average fees in percent;
column (5) reports the average portfolio turnover in percent; columns (6) and (7) report the mean and median
of absolute net inflows in million USD, respectively; and column (8) reports the number of manager changes per
fund. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For differences in means,
we apply a two-sample t-test, and, for differences in medians, we apply a Mann-Whitney-U -Test.
(a) Formation period
size fund age fees turnover absolute flows mc/fund
mean median mean mean mean mean median
10 (winner) 757.58 109.70 9.58 1.69 1.24 10.71 0.42 0.21
9 891.03 136.00 11.10 1.61 1.10 6.24 0.16 0.20
8 1127.44 149.40 11.39 1.56 1.01 5.41 0.10 0.21
7 1015.31 151.80 11.26 1.55 0.94 4.23 0.06 0.19
6 1032.41 145.69 11.72 1.55 0.96 3.12 0.02 0.21
5 863.43 143.70 11.55 1.60 1.00 2.68 0.03 0.21
4 951.42 143.09 11.34 1.62 1.03 1.22 −0.01 0.21
3 1009.47 144.05 11.64 1.64 1.12 −0.30 −0.05 0.23
2 820.64 136.90 11.41 1.69 1.21 −0.47 −0.10 0.23
1 (loser) 684.31 104.60 10.45 1.88 1.63 −1.23 −0.26 0.23
10 − 1 73.27∗∗ 5.10∗∗∗ −0.86∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗ 11.94∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ −
(b) Evaluation period
size fund age fees turnover absolute flows mc/fund
mean median mean mean mean mean median
10 (winner) 1059.93 180.06 10.58 1.67 1.16 14.52 0.50 0.20
9 1118.03 184.13 12.10 1.59 1.04 8.41 0.12 0.21
8 1329.14 192.50 12.39 1.55 0.95 6.35 0.06 0.18
7 1181.07 182.70 12.26 1.55 0.89 4.43 −0.01 0.19
6 1177.34 169.60 12.72 1.54 0.94 1.90 −0.03 0.18
5 968.96 170.40 12.55 1.60 0.97 1.45 −0.05 0.20
4 1022.96 163.50 12.34 1.63 0.97 −1.13 −0.13 0.21
3 1041.18 154.60 12.64 1.62 1.12 −4.21 −0.26 0.21
2 838.86 144.20 12.41 1.70 1.18 −3.77 −0.35 0.21
1 (loser) 673.59 100.30 11.45 1.88 1.57 −4.05 −0.53 0.21
10 − 1 386.33∗∗∗ 79.76∗∗∗ −0.86∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗ 18.58∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ −
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Table 4: Characteristics of winner-fund subgroups
This table presents the characteristics for the winner-fund subgroups and the resulting spread portfolios based
on a single sorting on absolute fund flows, on relative fund flows and on manager change. Funds are assigned
to the high-net-inflow (high) or low-net-inflow (low) subgroup based on whether their net inflows during the
formation period are higher or lower than the median net inflows of all other funds in the same decile. Funds
are assigned to the manager-change (with) or no-manager-change (without) subgroup based on whether their
fund manager changed during the formation period. Columns (1) and (2) report the average fund size in million
USD in the formation and evaluation periods, respectively; column (3) reports average absolute net inflows in
million USD in the formation period; and column (4) reports the number of manager changes per fund in the
formation period. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For differences
in means, we apply a two-sample t-test.
formation period evaluation period
abs. flows mc/fund size size
conditional on absolute net inflows (median split point)
10 low −4.50 0.22 507.53 561.27
10 high 25.78 0.22 1041.47 1596.60
10 low − 10 high −30.28∗∗∗ − −533.95∗∗∗ −1035.33∗∗∗
conditional on relative net inflows (median split point)
10 low −1.10 0.22 816.61 965.45
10 high 22.40 0.22 733.99 1199.03
10 low − 10 high −23.50∗∗∗ − 82.62∗∗ −233.59∗∗∗
conditional on manager change (without / with)
10 without 11.59 0.00 785.35 1106.94
10 with 7.10 1.00 643.56 866.76
10 without − 10 with 4.49∗∗∗ − 141.79∗∗∗ 240.18∗∗∗
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Table 5: Performance of winner-fund subgroups (single sorting)
This table presents different performance measures for the winner-fund subgroups and the resulting spread
portfolios based on a single sorting on absolute fund flows, on relative fund flows and on manager change. Funds
are assigned to the high-net-inflow (high) or low-net-inflow (low) subgroup based on whether their net inflows
during the formation period are higher or lower than the median net inflows of all other funds in the same decile.
Funds are assigned to the manager-change (with) or no-manager-change (without) subgroup based on whether
their fund manager changed during the formation period. Column (1) reports Bayesian four-factor alphas in
the formation period; columns (2) and (3) report raw returns and four-factor alphas in the evaluation period;
column (4) presents the change in performance between the formation and evaluation periods (∆ alpha). ∗∗∗,
∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors are used for the regression coefficients.
formation period evaluation period difference
4-factor α raw return 4-factor α ∆ 4-factor α
conditional on absolute net inflows (median split point)
10 low 0.83∗∗∗ 0.84 0.16 −0.67∗∗∗
10 high 0.94∗∗∗ 0.66 −0.05 −0.99∗∗∗
10 low − 10 high −0.11 0.17∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ −
conditional on relative net inflows (median split point)
10 low 0.82∗∗∗ 0.81 0.13 −0.69∗∗∗
10 high 0.94∗∗∗ 0.69 −0.03 −0.97∗∗∗
10 low − 10 high −0.12 0.12∗ 0.16∗∗∗ −
conditional on manager change (without / with)
10 without 0.89∗∗∗ 0.79 0.10 −0.79∗∗∗
10 with 0.87∗∗∗ 0.70 −0.02 −0.89∗∗∗
10 without − 10 with 0.02 0.09∗ 0.12∗∗ −
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Table 6: Performance of winner-fund subgroups (double sorting)
This table presents different performance measures for the winner-fund subgroups and the resulting spread
portfolios based on a double sorting on absolute fund flows and manager change simultaneously. See the note
to table 5 for more explanation.
formation period evaluation period difference
4-factor α raw return 4-factor α ∆ 4-factor α
conditional on absolute net inflows and manager change
10 low without 0.83∗∗∗ 0.85 0.18∗ −0.65∗∗∗
10 low with 0.83∗∗∗ 0.80 0.10 −0.72∗∗∗
10 high without 0.94∗∗∗ 0.69 −0.03 −0.97∗∗∗
10 high with 0.90∗∗∗ 0.63 −0.12 −1.02∗∗∗
spread portfolios
10 low without − 10 high with −0.08 0.23∗ 0.30∗∗∗ −
10 low without − 10 high without −0.12 0.17∗ 0.21∗∗∗ −
10 low without − 10 low with 0.00 0.05 0.07 −
10 low with − 10 high without −0.12 0.12 0.13∗ −
10 low with − 10 high with −0.08 0.18∗ 0.22∗∗ −
10 high without − 10 high with 0.04 0.06 0.09 −
Table 7: Characteristics of loser-fund subgroups
This table presents the characteristics for the loser-fund subgroups and the resulting spread portfolios based on
a single sorting on a single-sorting on absolute fund flows, on relative fund flows and on manager change. See
the note to table 4 for more explanation.
formation period evaluation period
abs. flows mc/fund size size
conditional on absolute net inflows (median split point)
1 low −10.72 0.26 792.06 674.15
1 high 8.15 0.21 593.03 694.77
1 low − 1 high −18.87∗∗∗ − 199.04∗∗∗ −20.62
conditional on relative net inflows (median split point)
1 low −9.66 0.25 560.40 481.26
1 high 7.09 0.22 823.60 879.86
1 low − 1 high −16.75∗∗∗ − −263.20∗∗∗ −398.60∗∗∗
conditional on manager change (with / without)
1 with −3.31 1.00 623.84 619.84
1 without −0.65 0.00 700.88 688.60
1 with − 1 without −2.66∗∗∗ − −77.04∗ −68.76
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Table 8: Performance of loser-fund subgroups (single sorting)
This table presents different performance measures for the loser-fund subgroups and the resulting spread port-
folios based on a single-sorting on absolute fund flows, on relative fund flows and on manager change. See the
note to table 5 for more explanation.
formation period evaluation period difference
4-factor α raw return 4-factor α ∆ 4-factor α
conditional on absolute net inflows (median split point)
1 low −0.99∗∗∗ 0.51 −0.20∗ 0.79∗∗∗
1 high −0.96∗∗∗ 0.40 −0.28∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
1 low − 1 high −0.03 0.12∗∗ 0.09 −
conditional on relative net inflows (median split point)
1 low −0.99∗∗∗ 0.50 −0.21∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗
1 high −0.95∗∗∗ 0.41 −0.27∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
1 low − 1 high −0.04 0.09 0.06 −
conditional on manager change (with / without)
1 with −0.97∗∗∗ 0.52 −0.18 0.78∗∗∗
1 without −0.97∗∗∗ 0.42 −0.26∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
1 with − 1 without 0.01 0.11∗∗∗ 0.08∗ −
Table 9: Performance of loser-fund subgroups (double sorting)
This table presents different performance measures for the loser-fund subgroups and the resulting spread port-
folios based on a double sorting on absolute fund flows or manager change simultaneously. See the note to
table 5 for more explanation.
formation period evaluation period difference
4-factor α raw return 4-factor α ∆ 4-factor α
conditional on absolute net inflows and manager change
1 low with −0.98∗∗∗ 0.61 −0.09 0.90∗∗∗
1 low without −0.99∗∗∗ 0.48 −0.23∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
1 high with −0.95∗∗∗ 0.44 −0.27∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
1 high without −0.96∗∗∗ 0.38 −0.29∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
spread portfolios
1 low with − 1 high without −0.02 0.23∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ −
1 low with − 1 high with −0.03 0.17∗ 0.18∗∗ −
1 low with − 1 low without 0.01 0.13∗ 0.15∗∗ −
1 low without − 1 high without −0.02 0.11∗ 0.06 −
1 low without − 1 high with −0.04 0.04 0.04 −
1 high with − 1 high without 0.02 0.06 0.02 −
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Table 11: Classification of investment objectives
This table presents the classification codes we have used to construct our sample. We use Lipper codes,
Wiesenberger codes and Strategic Insight codes (priority is given in this order if different codes assign funds to
different investment categories) in order to classify our funds into the following three groups: (1) Large- and
mid-cap funds (LMC), (2) small-cap funds (SC) and (3) sector funds (SEC).
Large- and mid-cap (LMC) Small-cap (SC) Sector (SEC)
Lipper CA, EI, EIEI, G, GI, I,
LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MC,
MCCE, MCGE, MCVE,
MLCE, MLGE, MLVE
SCCE FS, H, NR, S, SESE, TK,
TL, UT
Wiesenberger AGG, G, G-I, G-I-S, G-S,
G-S-I, GCI, GRI, GRO, I-
G, I-G-S, I-S, I-S-G, IEQ,
ING, LTG, MCG, S-G, S-G-
I, S-I-G, S-I, I*
SCG ENR, FIN, HLT, TCH,
UTL
Strategic Insight AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO,
ING
SCG ENV, FIN, HLT, NTR,
SEC, TEC, UTI
* Note that Wiesenberger code I for income funds is not restricted to income equity funds but also contains
income money market funds, income bond funds etc. Consequently we use a combination of Wiesenberger code
I and policy code CS or I-S or Wiesenberger code I and an allocation to stocks of at least 50 percent as condition
for funds to be included in our sample.
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